Leave The Conversion, Take The Point

Nobody's said that coaching football is easy.  There are countless stories of coaches working insane hours, sleeping in their offices, neglecting family, all to try to gain a sliver of an advantage on Saturday or Sunday.  In addition to preparation and planning, there are numerous in game decisions that can tilt an outcome.  Among these are when and if to challenge a play, and whether to use or save a timeout.  But one that seems to be glanced over seemingly on a weekly basis is the two point conversion.

The two point conversion has been used in college football since 1958, and in the NFL since 1994.  This allows the offensive team who has just scored a touchdown to bypass the extra point kick and attempt to reach the end-zone again, this time in one play from the 2 yard line.  If successful, 2 point are gained.  If not, there is no additional points.  Like most decisions, there is conventional wisdom as to when you should go for two and when taking the extra point is acceptable.  There are charts and everything to help coaches come to this decision.  But what charts don't take into account is the progress and time left in the game, as well as the fact that if unsuccessful, a coach may have harmed his team in a way that prevents victory.

Games should not rest on this chart

The two point conversion is a great addition to the game.  Honestly, it baffles me that the NFL waited until 1994 before instituting it.  It adds an extra element of strategy to the game, and in my opinion, when you can add more strategy and thinking to a game, it's a bonus.  Unfortunately coaches still have not mastered how to utilize this play to their advantage, forgoing long term strategy for a quick, short term gain.  You are trying to gain 2 yards in a 12 yard field with 22 men in that space.  Not that easy when you break it down.  The success rate of extra points last year was over 99% across the league.  The success rate of two point conversions last year was almost 35%, with 7 teams never attempting one.  It has also been argued that across the board, two point conversions have been successful over 50% of the time since it's been allowed.  However, what this fails to take into account is the specific game.  A team can lose a game because of a failed two point conversion in a close game but still finish a season with a 50% success rate if they are successful in conversions in games that they are far ahead or winning.

The prevailing wisdom in my mind, and what I've been preaching for years, is that you do not take points off the board.  There is no need to attempt a two point conversion when there is still a chance to score more points, so you take the easy extra point.  Clearly there are situations where going for two is a necessity, such as being down 8 with under 2 minutes left for example.  But it kills me week after week seeing coaches go for two in the second quarter or beginning of the 4th.  Or down by 15 late, going for two after a touchdown that has just cut the lead to 9.  Why go for two now, when if you fail, you are putting the game away by leaving a point off the board, even though you NEED another touchdown anyway?  If successful it is a great play, but the odds are that it will fail, and you have dug yourself a hole that you will be trying to dig yourself out of the rest of the game.

Yesterday's Packers-Colts game was a perfect example.  The Colts were trailing 21-13 at the end of the 3rd quarter when Andrew Luck ran for a touchdown.  Interim coach Bruce Arians decided to go for two to tie the game...and failed.  Again, the chart says that when you are down by 2, you go for 2, but this does not take into consideration there is 15 minutes left in this game in which anything can happen.  Turnovers, special teams, 3 and outs, anything.  By failing to convert, the Colts are now down 2 with the Packers getting the ball, and with a touchdown, can have a 2 possession lead.  This did not happen, and midway through the 4th the Colts kicked a field goal to put them up by 1.  When the Packers did get a touchdown with 4:30 left to make the score 27-22, they decided to go for two to make it a 7 point lead.  They failed.  Indy ended up scoring with under a minute to play and because of the earlier failed conversions, went for and converted their two point conversion attempt, winning the game by 3 when the Packers missed a last second game tying field goal attempt.  But what would have happened if Green Bay had just kicked the extra point?  They would have been up 6 with about 4 minutes to play.  Even if Indy did get a touchdown, they would have kicked the extra point (because being up 2 is the same as being up 1 in that scenario) and would have had a 1 point lead.  Then the Packers would only need a field goal to win, not tie.

The bottom line in my mind is that by going for two when it is not absolutely necessary you are not only leaving points off the board, but you are putting the overall strategy of the game in the hands of the opposing coach.  By going early for two, and failing, Arians put the strategy of the game in the hands of Mike McCarthy.  He could dictate to the Colts how they needed to score and may have either forced them into anther two point attempt, or at least put his team in a better position to win.  But when McCarthy went for two and failed, he put it right back in the hands of Arians.

Clearly there are those who will disagree with this opinion, which is expected.  But I look at scoring in football like blackjack.  If you take the points, know when to hit and know when to hold, and not take any crazy unnecessary risks, you will come out on top.  But I guess the majority of coaches are more into playing craps, as their decisions to go for two are exactly that; a roll of the dice.